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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Juan Carlos Maldonado appeals from his judgment of conviction for domestic abuse with
traumatic injury.  Mr. Maldonado was found guilty following a jury trial.  He submits that the
district court abused its discretion when it allowed hearsay statements to be admitted into
evidence.  He also asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial.
Further, Mr. Maldonado asserts that these errors are not harmless or, alternatively, that the errors
amount to cumulative error, depriving him of his right to a fair trial.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Given the disparate issues in this case, for purposes of clarity, the facts relevant to each
issue  will  be  set  forth  in  the  respective  sections  of  the  brief.   Generally,  however,  on  May 31,
2016, law enforcement responded to a Nampa house after a report of a domestic battery, and a
woman possibly being held against her will.  (11/17/16 Tr., p.280, L.8 – p.281, L.6.)  Once the
officers arrived at the house, they approached the front door and ordered anyone in the house to
come out.  (11/17/16 Tr., p.286, Ls.4-18.)  After that announcement, two people exited the
house, and then Mr. Maldonado came out.  (11/17/16 Tr., p.286, L.19 – p.287, L.8, p.295, Ls.7-
11.)  Subsequently, the officers entered the home and discovered Nelida Maldonado,1  who went
by “Nellie,” in the basement; she had sustained bruising to both eyes, a bruise on the bridge of
her nose, and a swollen lip.  (11/17/16 Tr., p.289, L.10 – p.292, L.25; State’s Exhibit 12.)
 The State charged Mr. Maldonado, by Information, with domestic battery with traumatic
injury committed upon his wife.  (R., pp.37-38.)  Mr. Maldonado proceeded to trial.  When
1 At certain points in the transcript, Ms. Maldonado is referred to as Nelida Valenzuela.  (See e.g.
11/18/16 Tr., p.18, Ls. 14-15.)
2Ms. Maldonado testified, she denied that Mr. Maldonado was responsible for her injuries and
said her boyfriend had battered her, and she only told the authorities that Mr. Maldonado hit her
to protect her boyfriend.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.56, L.4 – p.57, L.8, p.76, L.22 – p.77, L.7.)
Ultimately, however, the jury found Mr. Maldonado guilty of one count of domestic abuse with
traumatic injury and one related misdemeanor.  (R., pp.117-18.)  It also found that
Mr. Maldonado was a persistent violator of the law.  (R., p.119.)  Mr. Maldonado filed a notice
of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.165-66.)
3ISSUES
I. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed hearsay statements regarding
the identity of Ms. Maldonado’s assailant to be admitted?
II. Did the district court err in denying the motion for a mistrial made after the State played
an audio in which Ms. Maldonado told law enforcement that Mr. Maldonado had
previously been in prison for a long time?
III. Even if the above errors are individually harmless, was Mr. Maldonado’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process of law violated because the accumulation of errors
deprived him of his right to a fair trial?
4ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed Hearsay Statements Regarding The
Identity Of Ms. Maldonado’s Assailant To Be Admitted
A. Introduction
The district court abused its discretion by admitting the hearsay statements of
Ms. Maldonado regarding the identity of her assailant because that information was not pertinent
to her medical treatment or diagnosis.
B. Relevant Facts
On the day of the incident, paramedics arrived at the house shortly after law enforcement
and began talking with Ms. Maldonado; Haley Glenn, with the Canyon County Paramedics, met
with Ms. Maldonado first.  (11/17/16 Tr., p.319, L.9 – p.322, L.16.)  Prior to trial, the State told
the district court that it would be seeking to introduce, pursuant to the hearsay exception for
medical treatment or diagnosis, Ms. Maldonado’s statements to Ms. Glenn and to the Physician’s
Assistant at the hospital—Mr. Nelson—regarding the identity of her assailant.2  (11/17/16
Tr., p.14, L.20 – p.16, L.13.)  And, prior to its opening statement, the State told the district court
that it  had a “paragraph on the EMT” in its  opening, in which it  would repeat what Ms. Glenn
put in her report regarding the identity of her assailant.  (11/17/16 Tr., p.217, L.8 – p.220, L.24.)
Defense counsel objected and said that “there was nothing about the identity of attacker that was
going to be used in any way for diagnosis or treatment.”  (11/17/16 Tr., p.222, Ls.12-14.)  The
district court stated that the “indicia of reliability of the statement made to the medical
5personnel”  was  present  but  said  that  it  “may  or  may  not  be  pertinent  to  [Ms.  Maldonado’s]
diagnosis.  However, it also becomes one of those facts that’s inescapable.”  (11/17/16
Tr., p.222, L.15 – p.223, L.7.)  The district court ultimately allowed the State to make the
comment regarding identity in its opening statement and to question Ms. Glenn on the identity
issue under the medical treatment or diagnosis exception to the hearsay rule.  (11/17/16 Tr.,
p.223, Ls.8-14.)  It stated that defense counsel was on record as objecting.  (11/17/16 Tr., p.223,
Ls.14-18.)  Subsequently, the State said in its opening: “Nellie said her significant other that
morning had punched her repeatedly in the face and hit her in the ribs.”  (11/17/16 Tr., p.249,
Ls.12-14.)
At the trial, Ms. Glenn testified that Ms. Maldonado said she was awoken by her
significant other earlier that day, and they got into an argument that turned physical.  (11/17/16
Tr., p.322, L.14 – p.323, L.5.)  On cross-examination, Ms. Glenn acknowledged that
Ms. Maldonado said she was arguing with her “boyfriend,” but Ms. Glenn said she used the term
“significant other” in her written report of the incident.  (11/17/16 Tr., p.329, L.7 – p.332, L.4.)
Defense counsel asked if, given the nature of Ms. Maldonado’s injuries, the identity of the
person  who  inflicted  the  injuries  was  necessary  for  diagnosis  or  treatment,  and  Ms.  Glenn
responded, “Not the identity, I wouldn’t say,” and she stated that what was important for her to
know was the “mechanism of injury.”  (11/17/16 Tr., p.327, L.17 – p.329, L.6.)
Prior to any testimony the following day, the State told the district court that the
Physician’s Assistant who treated Ms. Maldonado at the hospital—David Nelson—would also be
testifying about what Ms. Maldonado told him regarding the identity of her assailant.  (11/18/16
2 The district court noted that this issue came up at the preliminary hearing, defense counsel
objected, but the magistrate court overruled defense counsel’s objection.  (11/17/16 Tr., p.15,
L.22 – p.16, L.6; Prelim. Tr., p.10, L.17 – p.11, L.6.)
6Tr., p.10, L.16 – p.17, L.8.)  Defense counsel stated that he had the same hearsay objection to
that testimony and said—with respect to Ms. Glenn’s testimony the prior day—that “there was
really no relation to the identity of the attacker to either diagnosis or treatment . . . .”  (11/18/16
Tr., p.10, L.20 – p.11, L.1.)  He also said that, before Mr. Nelson could testify regarding identity,
he would “like to see at least that foundation be present in the evidence.”  (11/18/16 Tr., p.11,
Ls.1-3.)  The State explained that Ms. Maldonado told Mr. Nelson during the exam that her
husband inflicted the injuries, and this could rebut the contention that it could have been another
person who committed the crime.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.11, L.11 – p.12, L.23.)  The district court then
attempted to clarify its prior ruling on the issue; it stated, “the identity of the perpetrator in that
presentation to the EMT is so intertwined with the patient’s description of events that the basis
for  the  reliability  of  the  exception  to  the  hearsay  rule  for  a  patient  statement  to  a  physician  in
support of medical diagnosis or evaluation and treatment, that that is just as reliable as the
patient’s statement.”  (11/18/16 Tr., p.13, L.7 – p.15, L.23.)
Mr.  Nelson  then  testified  out  of  the  presence  of  the  jury  to  lay  foundation  for  his
testimony on this issue.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.16, L.10 – p.27, L.6.)  He explained that there were
subjective and objective portions to a patient exam.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.17, L.27 – p.18, L.1.)  He
said that the subjective portion includes asking what happened to find out what brought the
patient to the hospital, and the objective portion is a physical exam.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.17, L.20 –
p.18,  L.1.)   He  also  said  that  after  the  exam  is  completed,  he  develops  a  plan  for  the  patient.
(11/18/16 Tr., p.18, Ls.2-4.)  When asked if it was important to know the identity of the attacker,
he explained that it was important that he make a record of such information, but he was more
focused on “understanding what we would call the mechanism of the injuries.  So, it isn’t exactly
7who, but . . . in this case, was it a man or a woman who hit you?  Is it someone larger or smaller
than you?  Did you fall off your porch?”  (11/18/16 Tr., p.19, Ls.16-24.)
On cross-examination, when asked whether an assailant’s identity was relevant to his
diagnostic evaluation, Mr. Nelson said, “[I]f there’s suspected abuse, that is something that we
try to elicit.  We want to know more about that.  But I don’t go into details about who it was.  If
they just say who it was . . . I just record what they say.”  (11/18/16 Tr., p.20, Ls.15-23.)
Additionally,  when  asked  whether  there  was  anything  about  who  hit  Ms.  Maldonado  that  was
relevant  for  a  long-term  treatment  plan,  Mr.  Nelson  said  there  was  no  paperwork  that  he  sent
home with patients about domestic assault treatment.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.21, L.2 – p.22, L.4.)
The district court then questioned Mr. Nelson.  It asked him if a patient came in and said
her husband had hit her, would that be pertinent because Mr. Nelson would know it was a man
who inflicted the injuries.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.22, Ls.10-17.)  Mr. Nelson said that that “would be a
reasonable thing for us to understand as far as the mechanism of the injury.”  (11/18/16 Tr., p.22,
Ls.18-19.)  The district court then asked, “You don’t say was it a man or a woman.  You just say
tell me what happened.  And then they explain it to you and then you glean from that what is
pertinent to your diagnosis?”  (11/18/16 Tr., p.22, Ls.20-23.)  Mr. Nelson confirmed that was
true.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.22, L.24.)  The district court then asked, “[I]f the patient then was going to
tell you I’m going to go back home then to the house where he’s at, would that be a concern in
your diagnosis of recommendations to her subsequently?”  (11/18/16 Tr., p.23, Ls.1-4.)
Mr. Nelson said it would be of concern, but in this case, police were in the emergency room, and
if he is aware that law enforcement is involved in a case and feels that the patient is stable
medically and could be discharged, then he turns the issue over to the patient’s family and law
enforcement for what happens “socially . . . beyond the discharge.”  (11/18/16 Tr., p.23, Ls.5-
817.)  The State questioned Mr. Nelson further, and he confirmed again that it was important to
know “the mechanism of the injury” as that could be important for subsequent medical providers
also.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.24, L.2 – p.25, L.19.)
At that point, the State argued that the fact that Ms. Maldonado said it was her husband
was relevant.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.27, L.19 – p.28, L.2.)  Defense counsel, however, pointed out that
only some of the information Ms. Maldonado gave to medical personnel fell under the exception
to hearsay rule, and he still did not believe that sufficient foundation could be laid in this case for
admitting the identity of Ms. Maldonado’s assailant.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.28, Ls.8-17.)
The district court then issued its final ruling on the issue.  It stated that Mr. Nelson asked
“open-ended questions” and, if the patient said she was hit by her husband, that would be
pertinent because he would know she was hit by a man as opposed to a child or some other
mechanism of injury….”  (11/18/16 Tr., p.29, Ls.6-25.)  The district court also stated, “[T]he
rule is and the longstanding hearsay exception is statements made in support of medical
diagnosis and treatment . . . and based on the way that Mr. Nelson . . . asked questions . . . he’s
eliciting any information that the patient has to tell him about the event . . . .”  (11/18/16
Tr., p.30, Ls.5-12.)  It went on to say, “Therefore, these are parts of the sum and substance and
intertwined with the statement made for medical diagnosis.”  (11/18/16 Tr., p.30, Ls.13-15.)
Finally, it stated, “But when the patient is telling things that this person is specifically looking
for, who did it, and then from that they intertwine other things, not necessarily the identity is so
important, it’s what they can glean from the identity, it was a man, this type of thing.  So I’m
going to allow it into evidence.”  (11/18/16 Tr., p.30, Ls.19-24.)
Mr. Nelson then testified before the jury and explained his evaluation process again.
(11/18/16 Tr., p.39, L.15 – p.41, L.20.)  When the State asked him what Ms. Maldonado said
9when he asked her what happened, he said, “She told me that she was assaulted, more or less, she
was punched several times . . . and then I asked her who did this or if she knows who did this.”
(11/18/16 Tr., p.44, Ls.11-20.)  The State asked how she replied to that question, and Mr. Nelson
said, “She said it was her husband.”  (11/18/16 Tr., p.44, Ls.21-22.)
C.  Standard Of Review
“The trial court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of evidence,” but its
decision to admit evidence will be reversed “when there has been a clear abuse of that
discretion.” State v. Lopez-Orozco, 159 Idaho 375, 377 (2015) (quoting State v. Robinett, 141
Idaho 110, 112 (2005)). When evidence is admitted under a recognized hearsay exception, the
inquiry is “whether the district court recognized that it did not have discretion to admit
the hearsay evidence if the requirements for an exception were not met; whether it acted
consistently with the rules governing hearsay exceptions; and whether it reached its decision to
admit the hearsay by an exercise of reason.” Id. (quoting State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418, 423
(2009)).
D. The  District  Court  Abused  Its  Discretion  By  Allowing  Ms.  Glenn  And  Mr.  Nelson  To
Offer Inadmissible Hearsay Evidence Regarding The Identity Of Her Assailant As That
Information Was Not Pertinent To Medical Diagnosis Or Treatment
Whether the identity of an assailant who inflicted injuries during a domestic battery that
required medical treatment can be admitted under this exception appears to be an issue of first
impression in Idaho.3  Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter
asserted.  I.R.E. 801(c).  Such statements are inadmissible as evidence unless they fall under a
3 As the district court noted, the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed the issue briefly in State v.
Crawford, 110 Idaho 577 (Ct. App. 1986).  (11/18/16 Tr., p.12, L.24 – p.13, L.4.)  In Crawford,
the Court of Appeals stated, “We question whether the identity of the assailant was necessary for
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recognized exception to the hearsay rule.  I.R.E. 802.  One of those exceptions applies to out-of-
court statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.  I.R.E. 803(4).  Under this
exception, the source of an injury may be admitted if it is “reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment.”  I.R.E. 803(4); State v. Nelson, 131 Idaho 210, 215 (Ct. App. 1998).
The rationale behind the exception is that “‘the declarant’s motive to disclose the truth
because his treatment will depend in part on what he says, guarantees the trustworthiness of the
statements.’” State v. Kay, 129 Idaho 507, 518 (Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Report of Idaho State
Bar Evidence Committee, C. 803, p. 6 (1983)).  That motive only applies to statements made for
the purpose of treatment as the exception “is premised on the assumption that such statements
are generally trustworthy because the declarant is motivated by a desire to receive proper
medical treatment and will therefore be truthful in giving pertinent information to the physician.”
Nelson, 131 Idaho at 215 (emphasis added).  Indeed, in a case factually similar to this one, the
district court limited admission of a victim’s statements to an EMT, excluding the statements as
to the assailant’s identity. State v. Hoover, 138 Idaho 414, 418 (Ct. App. 2003) (“The court
overruled  Hoover’s  hearsay  objection  regarding  EMT  Maines’  testimony  as  to  James’  [the
victim]  statements  to  him and permitted that testimony under a Rule 803(4) exception for
statement to medical personnel. The court, however, limited Maines’ testimony to James’
statements as to how her injuries had occurred, and did not permit Maines to testify as to who
James said had caused those injuries.”).4  Thus, nothing in Idaho precedent suggests that
anything but statements made for the purpose of medical treatment or diagnosis would meet the
the doctor’s diagnosis of the injuries.” Id. at 580. However, the court did not decide the issue as
it held that the doctor’s testimony was “simply cumulative” because the victim’s parents had
already testified regarding the victim’s “statements incriminating her husband.” Id. at 580-81.
4 This was not an issue on appeal in Hoover, but was noted by the Court of Appeals in its
discussion of the case.
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rationale for the I.R.E. 803(4) exception.  Not every statement made to medical personnel meets
this rationale, as acknowledged by the district court in Hoover.
Other relevant authority on the issue is mixed in large part because some courts have held
that the identity of the perpetrator can be pertinent to treatment in sex abuse cases.  For example,
in United States v. George, 960 F.2d 97, 99 (9th Cir. 1992), the court held that the identity of the
person who was accused of sexual abuse could be admitted under the exception.  It noted that,
“sex abuse involves more than physical injury; the physician must be attentive to treating the
victim's emotional and psychological injuries, the exact nature and extent of which often depend
on the identity of the abuser.” Id. (citation omitted).  And it went on to state, “depending upon
the nature of the sexual abuse, the identity of the abuser may be pertinent to the diagnosis and
treatment of sexually transmitted diseases.” Id.
George relied in part on United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985). Id.
Renville was also a sex abuse case in which the court held that the district court “did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the victim’s statements to the treating physician identifying her abuser.”
Id. at  439.  The Renville Court applied a two-part test for admissibility of such statements that
was first established in United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1001, 101 (1981).  That test was as follows: “first, the declarant’s motive in making the
statement must be consistent with the purposes of promoting treatment; and second, the content
of the statement must be such as is reasonably relied on by a physician in treatment or
diagnosis.” Id. at 436.  The Renville Court noted that Iron Shell recognized that statements
regarding identity “‘would seldom, if ever’ be reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis,”
but wrote, “We believe that a statement by a child abuse victim that the abuser is a member of
the victim’s immediate household presents a sufficiently different case from that envisaged by
12
the drafters of rule 803(4) that it should not fall under the general rule.” Id. (quoting Iron Shell,
633 F.2d at 84.)  As such, it held, “Statements by a child abuse victim to a physician during an
examination that the abuser is a member of the victim's immediate household are reasonably
pertinent to treatment.” Id. (emphasis in original).
Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Wyoming applied the two-part test from Renville to
a domestic abuse case in Oldman v. State, 998 P.2d 957 (Wyo. 2000). Oldman acknowledged
that “[i]dentity rarely is germane to the promotion of treatment or diagnosis,” but noted that,
“other courts have recognized that such statements can be relevant to treatment in instances of
child abuse” and found that there was “no logical reason for not applying this rationale to non-
sexual, traumatic abuse within a family or household, since sexual abuse is simply a particular
kind of physical abuse” and thus held that the first prong of the Renville test was met. Id. at 961-
62 (internal citations omitted).  It also held that the second prong of the test was met because the
“victim’s injuries included numerous human bites” and thus “[i]t was important for the
emergency room physician to know the source of the bites in order to treat the victim properly
for any infectious condition related to the assailant.” Id. at 962.  It went to state that “the victim
had been so brutally abused by the named assailant that the hospital reasonably could rely on her
statement in order to deny access to the hospital by the assailant.” Id.  Therefore, it held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the identity of the assailant. Id.
More recently, however, at least two state supreme courts have held that a “Renville-
type” analysis is flawed in that it conflicts with the customary understanding of the medical
treatment or diagnosis exception.  In Colvard v. Com., 309 S.W.3d 239 (Ky. 2010)—a sex abuse
case—the court acknowledged that it had previously adopted the Renville reasoning in a prior
sex abuse case. Id. at 244.  But it then stated, “Upon reconsideration of the plain language of
13
KRE 803(4) and its underlying purpose,” it had “come to the view that the identification
exception” it adopted was “based upon an ill-advised and unsound extension of a traditional
exception to the hearsay rule.” Id.
The court then considered the history of the exception and wrote, “There is no inherent
trustworthiness to be found in a hearsay statement identifying the perpetrator when that
statement did not arise from the patient’s desire for effective medical treatment.” Id. at 245.  The
court went on to note that various sources had commented that an expansion of the exception for
treatment of psychological issues was not consistent with the rule. Id. at 246.  It then stated that
it had “carefully considered the Renville rule, its merits and demerits,” and it now concluded that
its “adoption of the rule was an unwise departure from the traditional hearsay rule that has served
our system of justice well for many generations.” Id. Finally, it stated, “The Renville rule is
inconsistent with the plain language of KRE 803(4), and . . . the reliability of a child's
identification of the perpetrator of the abuse to a medical professional contains the same tangible
risks of unreliability generally inherent in all hearsay testimony.”  Id. at 246-47. It noted that
there could be cases where “statements of a child victim to medical personnel identifying an
abuser” would “comport with the requirements of” the exception, but this was “not such a case.”
Id. at  247.  Therefore,  the court  held it  was error for the trial  court  to admit the identity of the
alleged perpetrator. Id.
The Supreme Court of Iowa recently arrived at a similar conclusion in a domestic abuse
case. State v. Smith, 876 N.W.2d 180 (Iowa 2016).  In Smith, as in this case, the State—in
response to information that the victim might recant her statements regarding the identity of her
assailant—sought to prove Smith was the assailant by introducing the victim’s statements
regarding who had inflicted her injuries to the emergency room nurse and doctor under the
14
medical treatment and diagnosis exception. Id. at 183. The defendant argued that those
statements were not pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment, but the district court admitted
the statements under the exception. Id.
As in Colvard, the Smith Court examined the history of the exception. Id. at 185.  It then
stated, “When the identity of the perpetrator of an injury is not necessary information for
effective medical treatment, a declarant could remain motivated to truthfully describe the cause
of injuries while being motivated to suppress or twist the identity of the perpetrator towards their
own ends.” Id. at 186 (citation omitted).  The court noted that the State was arguing that cases of
domestic abuse should “fall within the same rule that commonly allows statements of the identity
of perpetrators in cases of child abuse to be admitted.” Id.  It then wrote, “There is no rule that
provides a categorical exception for victims of child abuse or domestic abuse.” Id. at 187.  It
acknowledged that domestic abuse was a serious problem, but said, “until a categorical rule
exists,” the explanation of how the identity of the assailant would be pertinent to medical
treatment, “must be supplied from the testimony of doctors in the form of foundation pursuant to
the broad rule providing for the admission of hearsay statements for all types of medical
treatment.” Id. at 188 (citation omitted).
It then stated that such foundation “need not be elaborate” but would have to establish
“why the identity of the assailant is important in a domestic abuse case, as opposed to stranger
assault, and what effect that identity has on diagnosis or treatment.” Id. at 189.  It recognized
that there was “a difference between the need to know the cause or external source of the
injuries—i.e., ‘what happened’—and the need to know the identity of the person causing the
injuries.” Id. at 189.  Finally, the court found that, “the foundational evidence relating to [the
victim’s] statements only pertained to the treatment she received for her physical injuries, not
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treatment she might have needed for her emotional, psychological, or other injuries as a result of
the domestic violence.” Id.  Further, there was,
no evidence to suggest [the victim] believed the identity of the perpetrator was
reasonably pertinent to her treatment or diagnosis. There was no evidence the
nurse or doctor told [the victim] the identity of the perpetrator was important to
the treatment or diagnosis of her injuries. There was no evidence the nurse or
doctor used the identity of the perpetrator to treat or diagnosis [the victim’s]
injuries. In fact, there was nothing from the circumstances at the hospital to
reasonably indicate [the victim’s] treatment or diagnosis would have been
different if she had not mentioned the identity of her perpetrator in describing
how she was injured.
Id. at 190.  Thus, the court held, “the circumstances mandated by the exception to show [the
victim] was self-motivated to truthfully describe her assailant were not established. Without this
foundation, the trial court erred in admitting the portion of the statement that identified Smith as
the assailant.” Id.
None of the above foundational requirements were met in this case either.  There was no
evidence to suggest that Ms. Maldonado believed the identity of her assailant was pertinent to
her treatment or that Ms. Glenn or Mr. Nelson used the identity she revealed to them to treat or
diagnosis her injuries.  Indeed, her treatment would not have been any different if she had not
mentioned who her assailant was.  The analysis discussed by the courts in Colvard and Smith is
appropriate as it represents the traditional understanding of the exception.  However, even if this
Court were to apply the test articulated in Renville, the facts of this case fail to meet even the first
prong of that test; there is no indication that Ms. Maldonado mentioned the identity of her
assailant to promote her treatment.
The district court, however, did not consider any of these factors in its analysis.  Instead,
it relied on an incorrect analysis.
Ms. Glenn testified as follows:
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Q: So what did Nelida tell you?
A: She told me her significant other had woken her up and began arguing with her.
About what, I do not know.  But that the argument escalated and became physical and he
began punching her in the face and torso.
(11/17/16 Tr., p.324, Ls.9-16.)  On cross-examination, Ms. Glenn was asked:
Q: Did Nellie appear to have any bites or anything on her?
A: I did not see any bites.
Q: Okay, so this was all blunt force trauma?
A: Correct.
Q: So you want to know the mechanism of the injury, probably, whether there was
any instruments used or if it’s just fists or something else?
A: Yes.
(11/17/16 Tr., p.327, L.17 – p.328, L.2.)  And once Ms. Glenn confirmed that there was nothing
other than blunt force trauma, defense counsel asked:
Q: Now, regarding the person that had done this to her, is that — is the identity of
that person necessary for diagnosis or treatment?
A: Not the identity I wouldn’t say.
Q: Just primarily the mechanism of the injury?
A: Yes.
(11/17/16 Tr., p.328, Ls.16-22.)
Despite her testimony to this effect, the district court stated, “It appears to me the identity
of the perpetrator is so intertwined with the patient’s description of events that the basis for the
reliability of the exception to the hearsay rule for a patient statement to a physician in support of
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medical diagnosis or evaluation and treatment, that that is just as reliable as the patient’s
statement.”  (11/18/16 Tr., p.15, Ls.1-7.)  The district court went on to say, “[T]he reliability of
that statement doesn’t appear to be a basis to separate that, because it seems to be intertwined
with the information that’s being collected.”  (11/18/16 Tr., p.15, Ls.13-16.)  Based on this, it
held that this information could come in under the exception.  This was not the proper inquiry.
“Only out-of-court statements necessary for medical diagnosis and treatment are admissible
under I.R.E. 803(4).” State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971, 974 (1992).  And, as Ms. Glenn
readily admitted, who inflicted the injuries was not necessary for diagnosis or treatment in this
case.
The  district  court’s  analysis  of  the  potential  testimony  of  the  physician’s  assistant—
Mr. Nelson—was similarly flawed.  After questioning Mr. Nelson, it stated that Mr. Nelson
asked “open-ended questions” and it said that if the patient said she was hit by her husband that
would be pertinent because Mr. Nelson would know she was hit by a man as opposed to a child
or something else.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.29, Ls.6-25.)  The district court also said, “[T]he rule is and
the longstanding hearsay exception is statements made in support of medical diagnosis and
treatment . . . and based on the way that Mr. Nelson . . . asked questions . . . he’s eliciting any
information that the patient has to tell him about the event . . . .”  (11/18/16 Tr., p.30, Ls.5-12.)
“Therefore, these are all parts of the sum and substance and intertwined with the statement made
for medical diagnosis.”  (11/18/16 Tr., p.30, Ls.13-15.)  Finally, it stated, “But when the patient
is telling things that this person is specifically looking for, who did it, and then from that they
intertwine other things, not necessarily the identity is so important, it’s what they can glean from
the identity, it was a man, this type of thing.  So I’m going to allow it into evidence.”  (11/18/16
Tr., p.30, Ls.19-24 (emphasis added.).)
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Again, this was the wrong analysis.  The crucial inquiry is whether the identity of the
assailant was reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis.  And the fact that Ms. Maldonado’s
statements regarding identity were in some way “intertwined” with the rest of her statements, did
not mean they could be or should be admitted under the exception.  Who inflicted her injuries
was not pertinent to her diagnosis or treatment.  Whether she was hit by her husband, her
boyfriend, or a stranger made no difference to how she was diagnosed or treated.
Moreover, Mr. Nelson’s testimony before the jury showed that he did not ask an open-
ended question to find out who inflicted Ms. Maldonado’s injuries.  He said he initially asked
open-ended questions, and when he asked her what happened, he said Ms. Maldonado told him
“she was punched several times.”  (11/18/16 Tr., p.44, Ls.12-19.)  Mr. Nelson then said, “[A]nd
then I asked her who did this or if she knows who did this.”  (11/18/16 Tr., p.44, Ls.19-20.)
Then the State asked how she responded, and Mr. Nelson said, “She said it was her husband.”
(11/18/16 Tr., p.44, Ls.21-22.)  The only thing that was necessary for Mr. Nelson to know for the
purpose of diagnosis and treatment was that Ms. Maldonado was punched several times.
As such, the district court abused its discretion when it allowed hearsay statements
regarding the identity of Ms. Maldonado’s assailant to be admitted because it did not act
consistently with the rules governing hearsay exceptions.  The hearsay statements that the State
used in its opening, and that the State elicited through the testimony of Ms. Glenn and
Mr. Nelson, did not fall within the exception for statements made for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment.
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II.
The District Court Erred In Denying The Motion For A Mistrial Made After The State Played An
Audio In Which Ms. Maldonado Told Law Enforcement That Mr. Maldonado Had Previously
Been In Prison For A Long Time
A. Introduction
The State presented the testimony of Detective Marang and questioned him regarding his
interview with Ms. Maldonado at the hospital.  Subsequently, the State played an audio
recording of that interview.  On that recording, Ms. Maldonado can be heard telling Detective
Marang that Mr. Maldonado had previously been in prison for a long time.  Defense counsel later
moved for a mistrial.  The district court agreed that the testimony was prejudicial, but—relying
on authority in a similar case—denied the motion for a mistrial, struck the recording from the
record, and told the jury that they were to disregard the information in the recording.  The district
court, however, subsequently allowed the State to recall Detective Marang for further
questioning about the recording and then admitted a redacted version of the exhibit.  That
additional testimony, and the redacted recording, reminded the jury of the prejudicial information
contained in the original recording, and thus the instruction provided by the district court was
insufficient to cure the prejudice.  As such, Mr. Maldonado asserts that the motion for a mistrial
was erroneously denied.
B. Relevant Facts
Detective Marang conducted a recorded interview with Ms. Maldonado at the hospital
after the incident.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.113, Ls.11-16; State’s Exhibit 23, State’s Exhibit 5.)  The
district court allowed Detective Marang to testify as to what Ms. Maldonado told him to come in
for impeachment.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.115, L.19 – p.116, L.13.)  After the State questioned
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Detective Marang about the interview, it moved for the admission of the audio recording of the
interview, and the district court admitted it for impeachment also.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.114, Ls.6 –
p.120, L.12; State’s Exhibit 23.)  The State then played the audio.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.121, L.16.)
Subsequently, defense counsel moved for a mistrial because, in the audio, Ms. Maldonado said
that Mr. Maldonado had been “in prison for a long time.”  (11/18/16 Tr., p.126, L.21 – p.127,
L.10; State’s Exhibit 23 at 5:30 – 5:45.)  The State admitted that it had planned to play a redacted
copy of the audio but it mistakenly played the unredacted version.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.127, Ls.20-
23.)
Subsequently, the parties listened to the audio again out of the presence of the jury and
discussed the motion for a mistrial.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.151, L.7 – p.164, L.15.)  Defense counsel
pointed out that the information on the audio was “extremely prejudicial.”  (11/18/16 Tr., p.152,
L.19 – p.153, L.1.)  The State proposed replacing the exhibit with the redacted version.
(11/18/16 Tr., p.154, Ls.6-17.)  The district court said it was considering striking the entire
exhibit because it did not want to draw attention to it by mentioning it to the jury.  (11/18/16
Tr., p.155, L.19 – p.157, L.6.)  However, defense counsel said, “[Y]ou can’t un-ring the bell.
The jury has heard all of this.”  (11/18/16 Tr., p.157, Ls.9-11.)
The State objected to striking the audio because it was “valuable impeachment evidence”
and said that it thought the error could be cured by replacing the audio with the redacted version.
(11/18/16 Tr., p.157, L.23 – p.158, L.9.)  The district court said it would consider a remedy other
than mistrial but noted that defense counsel preferred a mistrial.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.158, L.23 –
p.159, L.21.)  It said it would consider alternative remedies and that if Detective Marang’s
testimony  was  enough  to  get  in  “the  substance  of  [Ms.  Maldonado’s]  inconsistent  testimony,”
there would be “less harm in . . . striking that from what the State’s trying to gain and also helps
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protect the defendant.”  (11/18/16 Tr., p.161, Ls.1-11.)  The district court then told the parties it
was going to strike the exhibit; it said the State could offer a redacted version, but the audio was
“almost cumulative in effect.”  (11/18/16 Tr., p.165, L.6 – p.166, L.21.)  Ultimately, the district
court denied the motion for a mistrial and instructed the jury that Exhibit 23 was stricken from
the record and should be disregarded.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.169, Ls.5-7, p.176, Ls.1-17.)
Later, the State recalled Detective Marang.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.245, Ls.1-6.)  He confirmed
that he had listened to the State’s redacted version of the audio—State’s Exhibit 5—and that it
contained his interview with Ms. Maldonado.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.245, L.9 – p.246, L.10.)  Among
other things, the State asked Detective Marang with respect to the redacted audio, “This is just
basically the same thing we heard earlier?” and Detective Marang confirmed that it was.
(11/18/16 Tr., p.247, Ls.14-16.)  The State moved for the admission of State’s Exhibit 5, and the
district court granted the motion.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.247, Ls.17-20.)  The district court instructed
the jury that the audio was admitted for the purpose of impeachment and admitted it into
evidence.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.246, L.16 – p.247, L.21.)
C. Standard Of Review
Idaho’s appellate courts effectively review denials of motions for mistrial de novo.
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007).
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably
exercised his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the
mistrial motion was made. Rather, the question must be whether
the event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented
reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record.
Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal
case, the “abuse of discretion” standard is a misnomer. The
standard, more accurately stated, is one of reversible error. Our
focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that
triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge’s refusal to declare a
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mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed
retrospectively, constituted reversible error.
Id. (quoting State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 912 (2003) (quoting State v. Shepherd, 124
Idaho 54, 57 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95 (Ct. App. 1983))).
Error is harmless and not reversible if the reviewing court is convinced “beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209, 221 (2010).
D. The  District  Court  Erred  In  Denying  The  Motion  For  A Mistrial  Made  After  The  State
Played An Audio Exhibit In Which The Victim Can Be Heard Telling Detective Marang
That Mr. Maldonado Had Previously Spent A Long Time In Prison
A motion for a mistrial is controlled by I.C.R. 29.1, which provides that “[a] mistrial may
be declared upon motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the trial an error or legal
defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial to the
defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial.”  I.C.R. 29.1(a); State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho
386, 389 (Ct. App. 1996).
In this case, the jury learned that Mr. Maldonado had been previously convicted of at
least one felony when it heard that he had been “in prison for a long time.”  (State’s Exhibit 23 at
5:30 – 5:35; 11/18/16 Tr., p.151, L.24 – p.152, L.3.)  Ms. Maldonado went on to say in the
unredacted audio, “And, in prison, that’s a state of mind where you don’t like to be
disrespected.”  (State’s Exhibit 23 at 5:33 – 5:40.)  Such information is inherently prejudicial.
“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person to
show action in conformity therewith.” State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009) (citing
I.R.E. 404(b)).  “‘The prejudicial effect of [character evidence] is that it induces the jury to
believe the accused is more likely to have committed the crime on trial because he is a man of
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criminal character.’” Id. (quoting State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510 (1978)).  “Character
evidence, therefore, takes the jury away from their primary consideration of the guilt or
innocence of the particular crime on trial.” Id. (citation omitted).
The district court acknowledged that this information was a “significant aggravating
factor about the case that could cause the jurors” to be unfairly prejudiced against
Mr. Maldonado.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.157, Ls.1-6.)  Nevertheless, the district court denied the motion
for a mistrial and told the jury, “because I have determined that [the audio] inadvertently
contained information that is inadmissible, I am now ruling that the audio recording of Exhibit
23 is to be stricken from the record.  And you are to disregard anything you may have heard or
understood from the Exhibit 23 audio recording.”  (11/18/16 Tr., p.169, L.6., p.176, Ls.5-11.)
  The district court stated that its decision to deny the motion for a mistrial was
“consistent with” State v. Fluery, 123 Idaho 9 (Ct. App. 1992).  (11/18/16 Tr., p.166, L.6.)  In
Fluery,  a  co-defendant  testified  that  Mr.  Fluery’s  probation  officer  was  present  when  he  was
arrested. Id. at 10.  Mr. Fluery moved for a mistrial, but the district court denied the motion and
struck the testimony. Id. at 10-11.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s order
denying the motion for a mistrial. Id. at  11.   It  stated,  “Given the fact that this inadvertent
statement was not admitted, let alone erroneously admitted, and that a proper limiting instruction
was given, we find that there is no reasonable possibility that [the co-defendant’s] statement
contributed to Fluery’s conviction.” Id.
This case, however, is distinguishable from Fluery for several reasons.  First, the exhibit
was erroneously admitted and played to the jury.  (11/18/17 Tr., p.120, L.12 – p.121, L.16.)
Second, the statement of the witness in Fluery was certainly not as prejudicial as the statement in
the audio recording here.  The presence of a probation officer could simply mean that the
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defendant in Fluery was on misdemeanor probation, or had received a sentence of probation
only.    By contrast, when the jury learned that Mr. Maldonado had previously been in prison for
a long time, the jurors would likely believe that he had previously committed very serious crimes
in the past.  And finally, in Fluery, there was no indication that there was any further testimony
about the facts surrounding Mr. Fluery’s arrest.  Here, the State recalled Detective Marang for
further testimony about the audio, and then the district court admitted a redacted audio recording
of the same interview with Ms. Maldonado.  (11/18/17, p.247, Ls.14-21; State’s Exhibit 5.)
When the State recalled Detective Marang, the questioning went as follows:
Q. Detective Marang, you remember testifying earlier today?
A.    I do.
Q.     And an audio was admitted of your conversation with Nelida Maldonado?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.  That’s since been retracted.  I’m going to show you what’s been marked as
State’s Exhibit 5.  Have you had an opportunity to listen to State’s Exhbit 5?
A. I have.
Q. And what’s contained within State’s 5?
A. The interview with Nelida.
Q. All right.  And this one’s been redacted to conform with the Court Order?
A. Okay.
Q. Has it?
A. Yes.
Q. All right.  Have you heard some things that have been taken out?
A. Yes.
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Q. But in sum, does it contain the statements Nelly made to you?
A. It does.
(11/18/17, p.245, L.8 – p.246, L.10.)  This testimony reminded the jury of the prejudicial
information again when it referenced “some things” that had “been taken out” and thus only
served to draw attention to it.  This was exactly what the district court was concerned about when
discussing the motion for a mistrial.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.149, Ls.4-7, p.167, Ls.7-8.)  Further, the
district court admitted the redacted audio even though it admitted it was “almost cumulative in
effect,” and the State had already “gotten a lot of mileage” from Detective Marang’s testimony.
(11/18/16 Tr., p.166, Ls.18-21, p.168, Ls.8-15.)
 Thus the district court’s attempt to cure the error was not comparable with the quick and
precise  action  the  district  court  took  in Fluery.   Even  with  the  district  court’s  instruction,  the
jurors were likely unable to put the prejudicial information out of their minds because they were
reminded of it when Detective Marang testified about it again and when they could listen to the
redacted audio of the interview as they deliberated.  Therefore, the prior limiting instruction was
not sufficient to cure the error, and the limiting instruction did not cure the prejudicial inference
of  guilt  and  likely  had  a  continuing  impact  on  the  trial.   It  is  probable  that  a  jury  hearing  that
Mr. Maldonado had been previously convicted of a crime for which he had spent a long time in
prison would not evaluate the case in the same way as it would have had it not learned this
information and then been reminded of it again through the admission of State’s Exhibit 5 and
the additional testimony of Detective Marang.
As such, there is a great danger that the jury did not disregard the stricken information in
the audio, but that it considered it to Mr. Maldonado’s detriment, that it had a continuing impact
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on the trial, may have contributed to the verdict, and, ultimately, deprived Mr. Maldonado of his
right to a fair trial.  As such, it was error for the district court to not declare a mistrial.
III.
Even If The Above Errors Are Individually Harmless, Mr. Maldonado’s Fourteenth Amendment
Right To Due Process Of Law Was Violated Because The Accumulation Of Errors Deprived
Him Of His Right To A Fair Trial
Mr.  Maldonado  asserts  that  if  the  Court  finds  that  the  above  errors  were  harmless,  the
district court’s errors combined amount to cumulative error.  “The cumulative error doctrine
refers to an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, but when
aggregated, show the absence of a fair trial in contravention of the defendant’s constitutional
right to due process.” State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 629, 635 (Ct. App. 2002).  This Court can
find cumulative error if it concludes “that there is merit to more than one of the alleged errors”
and then concludes “that these errors, when aggregated, denied the defendant a fair trial.” Id.
(citing State v. Lovelass, 133 Idaho 160, 171 (Ct. App. 1999)).  Under that doctrine, even when
individual errors are deemed harmless, an accumulation of such errors can deprive a defendant of
a fair trial. State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453 (1994) (citations omitted).
Mr. Maldonado asserts that the district court’s errors discussed in sections I and II above
amounted to actual errors and deprived him of a fair trial.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Maldonado respectfully requests that his judgment of conviction be vacated and his
case remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this 14th day of December, 2017.
___________/s/______________
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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